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Studies using data from the early 1990s suggested that while the progressive Social Security benefit
formula succeeded in redistributing benefits from individuals with high earnings to individuals with
low earnings, it was much less successful in redistributing benefits from households with high earnings
to households with low earnings. Wives often earned much less than their husbands. As a result, much
of the redistribution at the individual level was effectively from high earning husbands to their own
lower earning wives. In addition, spouse and survivor benefits accrue disproportionately to women
from high income households. Both factors mitigate redistribution at the household level.
This paper compares outcomes for the earlier cohort with those of a cohort born twelve years later.
The aim of the study is to see whether, after the recent growth in two earner households, and the growth
in women's labor market activity and earnings, the Social Security system now fosters somewhat more
redistribution from high to low earning households. The analysis is based on data from the Health
and Retirement Study and includes members of households with at least one person age 51 to 56 in
either 1992 or in 2004. 
As expected, women enjoyed a more rapid growth of labor force participation, hours of work and covered
earnings than men. This increased the redistribution of Social Security benefits among households.
Nevertheless, a considerable gap remains between the labor market activities and earnings of women
versus men. As a result, the Social Security system remains much less successful in redistributing
benefits from households with high covered earnings to those with lower covered earnings than in

















  The Social Security benefit formula is designed to redistribute old age benefits in favor of 
individuals with low lifetime earnings. Studies using data from the early 1990s for individuals 
approaching retirement age found the Social Security old age and survivors program did meet 
that goal. However, Social Security was much less successful in redistributing benefits to 
families with low lifetime earnings. Three studies (Coronado, Fullerton and Glass, 2000; 
Gustman and Steinmeier, 2001; Liebman, 2002) conducted at roughly the same time on three 
different data sets found that, when lifetime benefit payments to households were weighed 
against taxes paid, there was surprisingly little redistribution fostered by Social Security old age 
and survivor benefits -- from families with high lifetime earnings to families with low lifetime 
earnings.
2  
  Since 1992, the labor force participation rate and fraction of women working full time 
has increased. As women's earnings increase, the relative value of their spouse and survivor 
benefits decline, and they benefit less from the redistributive structure of the benefit formula. 
Thus we expect that, at the family level, Social Security has become more redistributive over 
time. The question is, how much more redistributive has it become? This study estimates the 
                                                 
2 A study conducted by Harris and Sabelhaus (2005) for the Congressional Budget Office, using 
a CBO dynamic simulation model (CBOLT), concluded there was a significant amount of 
redistribution among families with different earnings levels. This conclusion was not strongly 
influenced by differences in mortality rates by those with different lifetime earnings, and held for 
the sample of households whether or not it included households where one of the members 
qualified for disability benefits. Hurd (2011) discusses the differences between the CBO results 
and those in other studies, including the three noted above, as well as Goda, Shoven and Slalov 
(2011), which is similar in approach to the three earlier studies. He concludes that there are 
unexplained differences between these sets of studies and the CBO results. 2 
change in redistribution fostered by the Social Security benefit formula between two cohorts, 
those who were 51 to 56 in 1992 and those 51 to 56 in 2004.
3 
  Of course, there are other changes affecting the value of benefits and taxes over that 
twelve year period. Social Security rules have been altered, raising the age at which an individual 
is entitled to full benefits, and thereby effectively reducing the value of Social Security benefits 
for members of younger cohorts. Moreover, an earnings test is no longer imposed after an 
individual reaches full retirement age. In addition, economic variables including interest rates, 
wages and productivity, have also changed over time. As interest rates decline, the value of 
benefits relative to taxes paid increases for members of cohorts nearing retirement age. Family 
structure has also changed, especially influenced by the increasing frequency of divorce.  
  It is difficult to standardize for all of these changes while maintaining a convincing 
underlying benefit structure. For example, one would not want to impose the benefit formula 
applicable to a 55 year old in 1992 on the real earnings of a 55 year old in 2004. Under the 
formula applicable twelve years earlier, a person aged 55 with average earnings in 2004 would 
be treated as having earnings well above the mean for the earlier period. Although one could 
artificially grow earnings over the intervening period, it would greatly oversimplify matters to 
use some average measure of annual earnings growth since the earnings structure has changed 
over this period, not only changing occupational, educational and other differentials commonly 
examined in the labor economics literature, but also between men and women, and among those 
with different family types. 
                                                 
3 This is the latest HRS cohort with matched Social Security earnings histories available at the 
time of writing this paper. The next youngest HRS cohort, the Mid Boomers, includes those ages 
51 to 56 in 2010. Survey data became available in the summer of 2011. Matched Social Security 
earnings histories for the Mid Boomer cohort are not yet available at the time of writing. 3 
  The simplest approach is to focus on the overall extent of redistribution relevant to each 
cohort, using actual earnings and interest rates for each year in question. Measures of 
redistribution will then be compared between cohorts both for individuals and families. 
Sensitivity of the findings to certain changes, for example the increase in frequency of 
households with a single, divorced person, will be examined. Thus we provide summary 
measures of the difference in redistribution under the Social Security benefit formula applying in 
each period, whatever the cause.  
  In the present paper, we concentrate on the change in redistribution of old age benefits 
experienced between the 1992 and 2004 cohorts from the Health and Retirement Study when 
individuals and households are arrayed by household covered earnings. For reasons of space, we 
do not duplicate all the steps taken in our earlier paper where we systematically examined the 
reasons for differences in distributions at the individual and family levels, including the 
correlation of earnings between husbands and wives by household income, and the relation of 
low earnings for women to years worked. In our earlier paper, we also emphasized that once the 
higher potential earnings of wives who chose not to spend much of their lifetime at work were 
taken into account, there was virtually no redistribution of benefits among households. Here we 
do not consider the earnings capacity of wives with limited commitment to the labor market over 
the life cycle. In both papers we focus only on redistribution of old age and survivors benefits 
and do not consider disability insurance.
4 
                                                 
4 In analyzing the redistribution of old age benefits fostered by the current system, we consider 
the payroll tax, but not the income taxation of Social Security. In a paper written at the same time 
as the present paper, Coe et al. (2011) do not find that income taxation of Social Security creates 
large changes in the measured progressivity of Social Security at the household level. 4 
  Section II sets the stage for the analysis. It reviews how Social Security rules work, and 
the differences in labor market activities of cohorts of women in their early to mid-fifties in 1992 
and 2004. Social Security measures are computed and compared between the two cohorts in 
Section III, focusing on the present values of Social Security benefits and taxes paid. Section IV 
then turns to the measures of distribution and redistribution fostered by the Social Security 
system, contrasting these measures between individuals and families within each cohort, and also 
between cohorts. In Section V we examine the robustness of the findings to changes in the 
frequency of divorced households and to differences in the interest rate. Section VI concludes. 
II. Framing the Problem 
  The Social Security benefit formula determining an individual's own benefits from that 
person's own earnings history is designed to be progressive. For example, as we will explain in 
more detail below, for a person turning age 60 in 2004, on an annual basis the Primary Insurance 
Amount (PIA), the monthly benefit an individual is entitled to at normal retirement age based on 
own earnings, replaces 90 percent of the first $7,344 of average indexed earnings, 32 percent of 
the next $36,924, and 15 percent of remaining earnings up to the covered maximum.  
  These redistributive effects of the formula at the individual level are mitigated at the 
family level. When wives have lower earnings than their husbands, by averaging over the two 
spouses, a progressive benefit formula generates less redistribution between families than 
individuals.
5 For men, there is a close correlation between their own lifetime earnings and the 
total of their own and their spouse's lifetime earnings. But for women the relationship is much 
                                                 
5 When wives from high income families spend less time at work, they receive lower earnings 
not only because they accumulate fewer hours of paid work, but also because by working fewer 
hours or years, they are paid a lower wage rate than if they had been fully committed to the labor 
market.  5 
weaker (Gustman and Steinmeier, 2001, Table 1). Women from high income households are 
often low earners. Thus when comparing men and women with the same level of own lifetime 
earnings, family lifetime earnings are higher for women than for men. As a result, redistributing 
benefits toward households where the woman's earnings are low subsidizes many households 
where the sum of lifetime earnings for husbands and wives is quite high. 
  In addition, as long as spouse and survivor benefits accrue disproportionately to 
households with one high earner, the spouse and survivor benefits paid by Social Security 
undermine the redistribution of benefits away from high income families. Both spouse and 
survivor benefits are top-ups over own benefits. If the spouse has not accumulated ten years of 
covered earnings, and thus is not eligible for own benefits, the spouse or survivor benefit will 
account for the entire benefit check. When the lower earning spouse has accrued ten years of 
covered earnings, but those earnings amount to less than about one third the earnings of the 
higher earning spouse, the benefit check of the low earning spouse will be topped-up.  The low 
earning spouse who receives benefits based both on own earnings and a top-up for spouse or 
survivor benefits is called a dual beneficiary. Only when both spouses have identical earnings 
histories are there no spouse or survivor benefits.
6 Moreover, in a household with high earnings, 
the top-up is likely to have a higher value than in a household with low earnings (Steuerle and 
Bakija, 1994).  
                                                 
6 We are ignoring here new claiming strategies for boosting the total value of Social Security 
benefits through manipulation of the claiming time of own and spouse benefits. For example, 
with two earners over the full retirement age, one person in the household may first claim 
benefits as a spouse, then claim own benefits at a higher annual rate because the initial claim date 
for own benefits has been postponed. 6 
  To be sure, there is an increasing tendency over time for women from higher income 
families to participate more fully in the labor market. This led Smith, Toder and Iams (2003) and 
others to predict that even if the benefit formula remained unchanged, the current Social Security 
system would once again become more redistributive at the family level.
7  
  Table 1 shows the differences in labor force participation, full-time work and lifetime 
covered earnings for a sample of individuals from the Health and Retirement Study. It includes 
two cohorts, those age 51 to 56 in 1992 (the HRS cohort) and those 51 to 56 in 2004 (the Early 
Boomer cohort). Over this period, women's labor market activity has increased substantially 
relative to men's (see also Iams et al., 2008). What was a 19 percentage point gap between the 
labor force participation rates of 51 to 56 year old men and women in 1992 declined to 8 
percentage points in 2004. Similarly, what was a 25 percentage point gap between the fractions 
of 51 to 56 year old men and women working full time in 1992 declined to 16 percentage points 
in 2004. The third panel in Table 1 reports the annualized value of indexed monthly earnings 
covered by Social Security, here indicated as Average Indexed Monthly Earnings (AIME) times 
12.
8 The ratio of AIME between men and women declined from 2.85 in 1992 to 1.98 in 2004. 
Although the gaps in the measures of labor market activity between men and women are 
considerably smaller for the 2004 cohort than for the cohort twelve years older, they remain 
substantial. 
                                                 
7 Note that Biggs, Sarney and Tamborini (2009) disagree with the predictions of Smith, Toder 
and Iams (2003). A part of the disagreement results from the different treatment of those who 
qualified for disability benefits at younger ages.  
8 AIME is computed from covered earnings and is increased by a wage index up to the year the 
individual turns age 60. Earnings are no longer indexed once the person reaches age 60. The 
AIME is averaged using the highest 35 years of covered, indexed earnings. Earnings after age 60 
will enter into the AIME calculation if they exceed indexed earnings in the lowest of the 35 years 
previously counted toward the AIME. 7 
 
Table 1: Labor Force Participation and Full-Time Work Patterns Over Time by Men and Women Ages 
51 to 56 in 1992 and 2004 
 
HRS Cohort, 
51 to 56 in 1992 
Early Boomers, 
51 to 56 in 2004 
  Labor Force Participation 
All Respondents  73  75 
Males  83  79 
Females  64  71 
 
Percent Working Full Time 
All Respondents  64  66 
Males  77  74 
Females  52  58 
 
AIME * 12 
All Respondents  23,626  33,048 
Males  35,881  42,881 
Females  12,608  21,676 
Data are from the Health and Retirement Study. 8 
III. Comparing Social Security Benefits and Taxes Between Cohorts  
  Before generating the rates of return to Social Security benefits over taxes, it is useful to 
discuss in somewhat more detail how Social Security retirement benefits are determined at the 
individual and family levels.
9  The Primary Insurance Amount (PIA) is the monthly Social 
Security benefit that would be received if claimed by the individual at full retirement age. It is 
calculated from Average Indexed Monthly Earnings (AIME). As noted above, for a person 
turning age 60 in 2004, on an annual basis the PIA replaces 90 percent of the first $7,344 of 
annual earnings, 32 percent of the next $36,924, and 15 percent remaining earnings through the 
covered maximum. Within the same household, the ratio of own benefits to own covered 
earnings will be greater for a lower earning spouse than for a higher earning spouse.  
  For members of the Early Boomer cohort, ages 51 to 56 in 2004 (born 1948 to 1953), full 
retirement age is 66. The full retirement age has been increased by 2 months for each year born 
from 1955 through 1960 -- a fact that becomes relevant when we calculate benefits for 
households where one member falls within the 51 to 56 age range, and the other is younger. For 
those born in 1960 or later, the full retirement age is 67. Similarly, the full retirement age may be 
lower than 66 for those with a spouse born before 1943. 
  Spouse benefits are calculated as half of the benefits that the primary earner would 
receive at full retirement age. If the low earning spouse is entitled to own benefits that exceed 
half the benefits of the high earning spouse, there are no spouse benefits. Survivor benefits are 
calculated from the full benefit the primary earner would have been entitled to had he or she 
                                                 
 
9 This study considers retirement benefits for each spouse. It does not include disability 
benefits, survivor benefits for young children or other such benefits provided by the Social 
Security system.  9 
survived. The formula for calculating full benefits may be adjusted to reduce the number of years 
of earnings counted if the deceased spouse died before reaching full retirement age. Survivor 
benefits are adjusted from the deceased spouse's Primary Insurance Amount, upward if the 
primary earner had delayed claiming benefits after reaching the full retirement age, or downward 
if the deceased spouse had claimed benefits early. 
  A person receiving spouse or survivor benefits is considered a dual beneficiary if that 
individual is also entitled to benefits based on own earnings that fall below the spouse or 
survivor benefit. Benefits based on own earnings are "topped up" to reach the benefit the 
individual is entitled to as a spouse or survivor. For example, if both spouses were the same age 
and retired at their full retirement age, with the high earning spouse entitled to a PIA of $900, 
and the low earning spouse entitled to $100 based on own earnings, the spouse benefit would 
top-up the benefit of the low earner from $100 to $450. If the higher earner died at full 
retirement age, the lower earning spouse would receive a total survivor benefit of $900, 
including the top-up.  
  All benefits are adjusted based on the age they are claimed. Own benefits are adjusted 
downward when claimed early, and upward when benefit claiming is delayed beyond the full 
retirement age. Spouse and survivor benefits are also adjusted for early claiming by the primary 
earner and by the spouse. 
  For this paper, we use the Social Security Administration's ANYPIA program to calculate 
own benefits for members of the Health and Retirement Study.
10 Because the ANYPIA program 
                                                 
10 In some cases, ANYPIA makes different assumptions from those we made in our 
earlier paper (Gustman and Steinmeier, 2001). For example, in our earlier study, we rounded the 10 
does not calculate spouse and survivor benefits, we calculate spouse and survivor benefits from 
the own benefit calculations for each spouse. The ANYPIA program requires information on the 
date of birth of each spouse, covered earnings history, and the expected date at which benefits 
will be claimed. We provide the required information from the HRS survey and feed it into the 
ANYPIA program in batch mode. In the course of projecting benefits, ANYPIA uses the 
information from the HRS data to project earnings into the future, and to calculate the Primary 
Insurance Amount based on that information.  
Table 2A reports the value of covered income and benefits of different types for 
individuals from the Early Boomer cohort of the Health and Retirement Study, those 51 to 56 in 
2004. Social Security earnings records are available for about three fourths of the respondents to 
the HRS from Early Boomer households. Benefits and taxes are imputed for those in the cohort 
without a matched record.
11  
                                                                                                                                                             
full retirement age to the nearest year, whereas ANYPIA keeps track of the full retirement age to 
the month.  
 
11 Imputations for those with a missing Social Security records are based on a nearest neighbor 
technique using a regression with the following covariates: if U.S. born, job tenure for longest 
job held, job tenure for current job, total number of years worked, number of jobs held, number 
of divorces, number of widowhoods, number of marriages, length of longest marriage, number of 
children, age, gender, education, race, union membership, earnings from current job, industry 
and occupation of current job, if self employed, if public employee, if retired,  veteran, disabled, 
not in labor force, and employment status from 1992 to 2004. For households where one of the 
spouses was not interviewed we used an index indicating the respondent's gender, age, race, 
earnings, spouse's gender, age, race, earnings, and household assets.  
  There are two groups of donors for missing spouses of divorced respondents. For those 
who are not currently married, the donors are respondents, whether currently married or not, who 
are or had been divorced. In the case of donors who are divorced and not remarried, their 
marriage had to last at least 10 years. For missing spouses of widowed (widowered) respondents, 
the donors are respondents, whether currently married or not, who are or had been widowed 
(widowered). 11 
Column 1 reports the annual average for indexed earnings (AIME*12). Annual benefit 
amounts based on the individual's own work are reported in column 2 assuming retirement at the 
individual's expected retirement age.
12 The present value of own benefits is reported in column 3. 
The remaining columns in Table 2A pertain to spouse and survivor benefits, attributing them in 
columns 4 and 5 to the person whose high earnings generated the top-ups for their spouse, and 
attributing the top-ups to the person who receives them in columns 7 and 8. The rows in Table 
2A first report results for all respondents, then separately for men by marital status, and then for 
women by marital status.  
Looking across row 1, annual indexed earnings average $33,048 for each respondent, 
with the yearly value of AIME $42,881 for men and $21,676 for women. Roughly speaking, 
covered earnings for women are half those for men (the ratio of AIME of women to men is .505). 
Moreover, the gap is even wider within married households. Annualized AIME for married men 
is $46,433, while for married women it is $21,615, so that married women have 46.6 percent of 
the covered earnings of married men. The Primary Insurance Amount (PIA) multiplied by 12, 
$16,790, is reported in column 2.  
Column 3 shows the present value of benefits based only on own work, with benefits 
beginning at the expected retirement age. Annual benefits are discounted to 2004 using interest 
rates from The Trustee's Report.
13 Benefits are weighted by survival probabilities using a life 
                                                 
12 We also did the calculations in these tables assuming all individuals retired at their full 
retirement age. Those results are similar to the results reported in Table 2A and 2B. If the 
respondent reported an expected retirement age of less than 62, the benefits are calculated using 
age 62 as the retirement age. If the respondent reported expected retirement at age 70 or later, or 
never expecting to retire, benefits are calculated assuming a retirement age of 70. 
13 U.S. Social Security Administration (2010), Table VB.2. Additional Economic Factors, Page 
104. The nominal rate is the average of the nominal interest rates for special U.S. Government 12 
table adjusted for variation in life expectancy with income and education. For individuals from 
households with at least one member age 51 to 56 in 2004, the present value of benefits based on 
own work is $135,358. At $119,865, the present value of benefits women will receive based on 
own earnings is 80.6 percent of the present value men will receive based on own earnings 
($148,753). With women enjoying four fifths of the benefits from own earnings as men, women 
clearly benefit considerably from the redistributional benefit formula since, as noted above, 
women had about half the covered earnings of men.  
For married men benefits are worth $157,770. Benefits for divorced, widowered or never 
married men fall below those values. Divorced women living alone have benefits based on own 
work that are about 8.4 percent more valuable than the benefits earned by married women, and 
about one quarter more valuable than the benefits based on own earnings received by widows.  
Columns 4, 5 and 6 credit the spouse who is the primary earner with any spouse and 
survivor benefits that will be paid as a result of the primary earner's covered income. Columns 4 
and 5 report the values of the top-ups in benefits for qualifying spouses and for widowers or 
widows of primary earners, all adjusted by the probability the individual will fall into that state.
14 
Spouse and survivor benefits paid to the wives and widows of primary male earners, 
respectively, are seen in columns 4 and 5, row 2, to be worth $11,472 and $45,066, raising the 
total value of benefits earned by men from their work from $148,753, the amount they would be 
                                                                                                                                                             
obligations issuable to the trust funds in each of the 12 months of the year. Historical values are 
used until 2010 and projections from the intermediate cost assumptions are used thereafter. 
14 Since we begin the calculation of survival probabilities at age 21, Table 2A and subsequent 
tables include imputations for taxes paid by deceased spouses. Divorced spouses are also 
imputed. However, their benefits and taxes paid are not counted in the population totals since 
their spouse is presumably included in the divorced or married (for a second time) population of 
the other gender. Nevertheless, the benefits of the missing divorced spouse must be imputed to 
calculate the spouse or survivor benefits of the divorced person who is included in the sample.  13 
entitled to based on own earnings, to $205,291, or by about 38 percent.
15 Total benefits reported 
in column 6, amounting to $167,636, include own benefits plus any spouse or survivor benefits 
due to own earnings.  
Comparing the values in columns 4 and 5, rows 2 and 7, it can be seen that the spouse 
and survivor benefits generated by women's earnings are only a small fraction of the spouse and 
survivor benefits due to the earnings of men. The basic reason is that, with most men having 
higher earnings than their wives, they are not entitled to any spouse or survivor benefits. On the 
other hand, wives with significant commitment to the labor market are entitled to a top-up as 
long as their covered earnings fall below those of their husbands. Moreover, with the significant 
degree of nonparticipation by wives shown in Table 1, adjustments for the timing of retirement 
aside, wives who are not eligible for own benefits are nevertheless eligible for half the benefits 
earned by their husband while both are still alive, and to their husband's full benefits should he 
die. 
Columns 7, 8 and 9 report each individual's own earnings, plus spouse and survivor 
benefits paid to the individual based on their spouse's earnings. Here the spouse that receives the 
check from SSA is credited with spouse and survivor benefits even though their husband or wife 
accounted for the earnings and paid the taxes that underlie their benefits. In contrast to the results 
in columns 4 and 5, here men are credited with very little in the way of spouse and survivor 
benefits. Specifically, as seen in row 2, columns 7, 8 and 9, for men the top-up to own benefits 
from spouse benefits is $1,015, while the expected value of survivor benefits is $2,672. 
                                                 
15 Ninety-two out of 1,344 married men have a positive spouse benefit. Average spouse benefit 
for this group is $16,522. Out of 1,345 married women, 579 have a positive spouse benefit. 
Average spouse benefit for this group is $30,302. 14 
Together, the spouse and survivor benefits received by men are worth only about 2.5 percent of 
the present value of the benefits they receive due to their own covered work. 
Table 2B presents indicators of annual earnings and benefits for members of HRS 
households with at least one person aged 51 to 56 in 1992. To facilitate a comparison with Table 
2A, the dollar amounts in Table 2B are reported in 2004 dollars.   
At $23,626, annual indexed covered earnings for the 1992 cohort are about 71 percent of 
the $33,048 value reported for the 2004 cohort. A number of factors account for these 
differences. Among them are differences in real earnings and the lower cap on covered earnings 
for members of the 1992 cohort (Gustman, Steinmeier and Tabatabai, 2010). Another reason is 
the lower earnings of women in the earlier cohort. While earnings of women were about half the 
earnings of men in the 2004 cohort, AIME for the 1992 cohort is $35,881 for men and $12,608 
for women, so that women from the 1992 cohort earned only about 35 percent of the covered 
earnings of men.
16 Within married households, the gap in earnings between men and women was 
considerably wider for the 1992 cohort, with married women earning only 31 percent of the 
covered earnings of married men. This compares to 46.6 percent when comparing the earnings of 
married women and married men from the 2004 cohort.  
                                                 
16 In 2004, 60.0 percent (weighted) of women living in a household with at least one 
person age 51 to 56 were married. In 1992, 70.4 percent of women were married. Most of the 
difference is accounted for by divorces. In 2004, 28.3 percent of women in this age range lived in 
a single person household and were divorced. The comparable number in 1992 is 16.4 percent. 
With fewer women in married households in 2004, the distribution of benefits across households 
is more unequal. This change in household structure is another reason for the observed 
differences between the two cohorts. We explore the sensitivity of the findings to the change in 
weight for divorced households below. 
 15 
Table 2A: Covered Earnings and Benefits Earned By Members of HRS Households in 2004 (in 2004 dollars) 
  Own Benefits      Generated by Own Earnings  Generated by Own & Spouse’s  
Earnings 
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VALUES FOR INDIVIDUAL RESPONDENTS 
All  Rs  33,048  16,790 
 
135,358  6,600  24,789  166,747  4,989  19,345  159,692  3764 
All Males  42,881  20,272 
 
148,753  11,472  43,809  204,034  1,015  2,672  152,440  1791 
Married Males  46,433  21,334  157,770  13,921  53,210  224,901  1,074  2,971  161,815  1344 
Divorced Males 
Living Alone 
37,378  19,061  134,159  6,832  25,881  166,872  1,353  2,860  138,372  244 
Widowered Males  22,927  14,089  110,586  NA  NA  110,586  NA  NA  110,586  113 
Never Married 
Males 
25,065  13,912  97,273  NA  NA  97,273  NA  NA  97,273  90 
All Females  21,676  12,764 
 
119,865  967  2,792  123,624  9,585  38,632  168,082  1973 
Married Females  21,615  12,509  117,384  1,353  3,472  122,209  12,342  48,661  178,387  1345 
Divorced Females 
Living Alone 
22,768  13,477  127,262  451  2,437  130,150  7,211  32,000  166,473  406 
Widowed Females  16,202  10,857  101,569  NA  NA  101,569  NA  NA  101,569  124 
Never Married 
Females 
25,009  15,224  141,456  NA  NA  141,456  NA  NA  141,456 
 
98 
Sample includes members of households where at least one individual is 51 to 56 in 2004. All values use survey weights. 
* Spouse and survivor benefits are attributed to individuals whose earnings generated the benefits. Total benefits (column 6) = column 3 + 
column 4 + column 5. 
** Spouse and survivor benefits are generated based on individual's spouse’s earnings. Total benefits (column 9) = column 3 + column 7 + 
column 8. 16 
Table 2B: Covered Earnings and Benefits Earned By Members of HRS Households in 1992 (2004 dollars) 
 
Sample includes members of households where at least one individual is 51 to 56 in 1992. All values are reported in 2004 
dollars and are calculated using survey weights. 
* Spouse and survivor benefits attributed to individuals whose earnings generated the benefits. Total benefits (column 6) = 
column 3 + column 4 + column 5. 
** Spouse and survivor benefits are generated based on individual’s spouse’s earnings. Total benefits (column 9) = column 3 + 
column 7 + column 8.
  Own Benefits      Generated by Own Earnings    Generated by Spouse’s Earnings   























Value of  





















Value of  









Value of  





 Total * 
Benefits 
Own +  










Value of  








Value of  





 Total ** 
Benefits 
Own +  






VALUES FOR INDIVIDUAL RESPONDENTS 
All  Rs  23,626  12,986  101,563  6,774  20,648  128,985  7,348  22,343  131,254  12,314 
All Males  35,881  18,210  132,066  15,201  46,148  193,415  442  907  133,414  5653 
Married Males  37,240  18,808  137,470  18,654  56,457  212,580  546  1,088  139,104  4769 
Divorced Males 
Living Alone 
32,291  16,505  115,433  1,490  5,581  122,505  13  171  115,617  596 
Widowered Males  29,134  15,445  109,706  NA  NA  109,706  NA  NA  109,706  92 
Never Married 
Males 
24,664  13,565  92,772  NA  NA  92,772  NA  NA  92,772  196 
All Females  12,608  8,288  74,135  286  938  75,359  12,468  38,398  125,001  6661 
Married Females  11,586  7,686  68,821  404  1,284  70,510  17,589  54,135  140,546  4889 
Divorced Females 
Living Alone 
15,032  10,152  90,169  4  206  90,379  260  1,208  91,637  977 
Widowed Females  12,060  8,143  72,769  NA  NA  72,769  NA  NA  72,769  565 
Never Married 
Females 
23,739  12,223  111,058  NA  NA  111,058  NA  NA  111,058  230 17 
For the 2004 cohort, we noted that based on own earnings, the present value of benefits 
received by women amounts to about four fifths of the present value of benefits men receive 
based on own earnings. For the 1992 cohort, the relevant amounts for women and men, again in 
2004 dollars, were $74,135 and $132,066. Thus the 1992 cohort of women enjoyed only 56 
percent of the benefits from own earnings as men. Again, the major growth in women's earnings 
is plainly evident in the data, even between cohorts separated by only 12 years of age.  
In addition, for the 2004 cohort, we found that spouse and survivor benefits paid to the 
wives and widows of primary male earners increased the total value of benefits earned by men 
from the amount they would be entitled to based on own earnings by about 37 percent 
(11,472+43,809)/148,753. For the 1992 cohort, spouse and survivor benefits were more 
important, raising the total value of benefits by 46.5 percent (15,201+46,148)/132,066.  
It is also constructive to compare the relative importance of spouse and survivor benefits 
to own benefits for women. From Table 2B, using data for the 1992 cohort, columns 7, 8 and 9, 
row 7, spouse and survivor benefits accounted for 68.6 percent of the total benefits women 
would receive from own earnings (12,468+38,398)/74,135. For the 2004 cohort, spouse and 
survivor benefits accounted for 40.2 percent of the total benefits eventually to be received by 
women (9,585+38,632)/119,865. 
In contrast to the results for individuals reported in Tables 2A and 2B, Table 3 reports 
benefit values for households with at least one member age 51 to 56. The two rows compare 
outcomes between the 2004 and 1992 cohorts evaluated in 2004 dollars. Household benefits 
count the total of benefits received, from own earnings and from spouse and survivor benefits.  
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Table 3: Covered Earnings and Benefits for Members of HRS Households with at Least One Individual Age 51 to 56 in 2004 and 1992 
 




Value of  







Value of  







Share of Total  
Benefits Due to  



















All Households  
2004 
 
56,396  30,073  220,040  10,473  40,526  271,093  0.188 
All Households 
1992 in 2004 dollars 
37,498  20,776  160,756  11,560  36,574  208,890  0.230 
The number of households in the 2004 sample is 2,287. In the 1992 sample there are 7,611 households. Values are calculated 






As seen in the next to last column of row 1, in 2004 the present value of total benefits in 
each household averaged $271,093. Benefits from own earnings amounted to $220,040, with a 
top-up for spouse benefits of $10,473, and for survivor benefits of $40,526. Thus benefits from 
own earnings account for over four fifths of total benefits (81.2 percent), while as shown in the 
last column of the table, the top-up for spouse and survivor benefits accounts for a little under 
one fifth (18.8 percent) of total benefits. 
Row 2 reports comparable figures for those ages 51 to 56 in 1992. To facilitate 
comparisons, present values are calculated in constant 2004 dollars. In 1992, 23.0 percent of total 
benefits were in the form of spouse and survivor benefits ($11,560+ $36,574)/$208,890. Thus 
with the increase in women's labor force participation and earnings, the share of total benefits 
enjoyed by households from spouse and survivor benefits fell from 23.0 percent in 1992 to 18.8 
percent of total benefits between 1992 and 2004. 
  Table 4 provides a picture of the trends in benefits and taxes at the individual and family 
levels.
17 As seen in rows 1 and 2 of column 2, for members of the 1992 HRS cohort, the present 
values of benefits and taxes based on own earnings were roughly equal at $106,000 and 
$102,000 respectively. By 2004, benefits based on own work amounted to only 81 percent of 
taxes paid. This decline in the returns to Social Security taxes reflects the changes in the benefit 
structure implemented to help solve the financial problems of the Social Security system, and 
shows itself in one form or another in all comparisons between the two cohorts. 
                                                 
17 In calculating the tax rate, we include both the employer's and the worker's share of the tax. 
Because this study focuses only on retirement benefits, the payroll tax rate we use does not 
include the taxes that support disability benefits or Medicare benefits. For example, the relevant 
payroll tax rate used in our calculations for the years after 2000 is 10.6 percent. 20 
  It is instructive to consider the changes for men and women separately. Real taxes 
increased by 37 percent for men, but reflecting the major changes in their lifetime participation 
and resulting earnings, taxes increased by 86 percent for women. Own benefits increased by only 
12.6 percent for men (132,066/148,753). On the other hand, for women, own benefits grew by 
61.7 percent, reflecting the overwhelming trend in their participation and resulting positive 
effects on earnings. 
  As found in the data for own benefits and taxes, benefits grew more slowly than taxes at 
the household level. The last column in the bottom panel of Table 4 shows that household Social 
Security benefits rose by 30 percent between the 2004 and 1992 cohorts, while taxes paid at the 
household level rose by 53 percent. (This result is partially affected by the change in the 
composition of households between 1992 and 2004, an issue we will return to below.) In 2004 at 
the household level, the present value of Social Security benefits, at $271,000, slightly exceeded 
the present value of taxes paid, at $260,000, by four percent. In contrast, as seen in the last row 
in column 2, in 1992, the initial year of the HRS, total benefits at the household level exceeded 
taxes by about 23 percent. As a result of the slower relative growth of benefits, by 2004 the 





Table 4: Present Values of Social Security Benefits and Taxes for Individuals and Households, from 
Households with at Least One Person Age 51 to 56 in 2004 or 1992. (All Values in Thousands of 2004 
Dollars) 
 
  2004 Cohort  1992 Cohort  Ratio 2004 Cohort to 1992 
Cohort 
Own Benefits and Taxes 
All       
Average lifetime taxes 
 




135  102  1.32 
Benefits/Taxes  .81  .96  .84 
Men       
Average lifetime taxes 
 




149  132  1.13 
Benefits/Taxes  .69  .84  .82 
Women       
Average lifetime taxes 
 




120  74  1.62 
Benefits/Taxes  1.09  1.25  .87 
Household Benefits and Taxes 
Average lifetime taxes 
 




271  209  1.30 
Benefits/Taxes  1.04  1.23  .85 
 
Values are calculated using survey weights. 22 
IV. Comparing Measures of Distribution and Redistribution Between Cohorts   
  A. Distribution and Redistribution of Own Benefits and Taxes 
  Table 5 reports a variety of measures of benefit and tax distribution and redistribution for the 
individuals in the Early Boomer Cohort in 2004, members of households with at least one person age 51 
to 56 in 2004. The population is divided into deciles according to their annualized Average Indexed 
Monthly Earnings and outcomes are reported separately by AIME decile. The first two rows report the 
present values of taxes and benefits as of 2004. Values are weighted by survival probability, which 
includes adjustments for income. The present values of taxes and benefits for the full sample of Early 
Boomers is reported in the last column of the table.  
  The first set of measures of redistribution involves a simple comparison of benefits and taxes for 
members of each AIME decile. Row 3 reports the ratio of the present value of benefits to taxes paid over 
the expected lifetime. In this comparison, benefits include only those due to own earnings. Although 
there are positive benefits shown for members falling within the decile with the lowest ten percent of 
covered earnings, there is no redistribution to individuals falling in that decile in the sense that their 
benefits fall below taxes paid. Many falling into the bottom AIME decile have not worked for the 
required ten years and thus do not qualify for Social Security benefits. Benefits do exceed taxes for those 
falling in the second to fifth AIME deciles, then fall below taxes for those in the remaining deciles. For 
those in the second, third and fourth deciles, there is significant redistribution. Own benefits exceed own 
taxes by 53 percent, 59 percent and 23 percent respectively. The ratio of the present value of benefits to 
taxes for the full cohort is .81 (135/166) as reported in the last column of row 3.  
  Row 4 of Table 5 reports a second measure of the extent of redistribution fostered by the benefit 
formula. The baseline is taken as the level of benefits that would be received by members of the decile 23 
based on own earnings if their benefits amounted to 81 percent of the taxes they paid, the average ratio 
for the Early Boomer Cohort. That is, the baseline asks what benefits would be if the benefit-tax ratio for 
members of the decile were the same as the benefit-tax ratio for all members of the Early Boomer 
cohort. For example, from column 3, row 4 of the table, members of the third AIME decile receive 
benefits that are 84 percent higher than they would be if their benefits amounted to 81 percent of the 
taxes they paid. Moving across the columns in row 4, those in the second to seventh deciles of AIME 
receive benefits that exceed what they would have received at 81 percent of the taxes they paid. Those in 
the last three deciles have had their benefits reduced by the progressive benefit formula. Members of the 
decile with highest AIME have their benefits reduced by 32 percent below what they would have been 
with an 81 percent replacement rate. 
  Another measure of redistribution asks about the share of total benefits paid to members of the 
cohort that is redistributed to the members of each decile. Specifically, the figures in row 5 divide the 
benefits redistributed to the decile by the total value of benefits paid to members of the Early Boomer 
cohort. Altogether, 11.39 percent of total benefits paid (-1.51 -3.50 -6.38) are redistributed from 
members of the three highest AIME deciles to the remainder of the population. Those falling in the 
lowest decile also receive benefits that fall slightly below the taxes they paid, with the shortfall 
amounting to 0.3 percent of total benefits paid to members of the cohort. 
 24 
Table 5: Baseline Measures of Distribution and Redistribution of Own Social Security Benefits and Taxes for All Age Eligible 
Respondents in the Early Boomer Cohort in 2004 
   
Annualized individual AIME deciles: 2004 (2004 dollars) 
0-4 K  4-9  9-14  14-20  20-27  27-35  35-44  44-57  57-73  73+  All 
 
Average lifetime taxes 
 
$10 K  34  59  91  124  163  204  258  324  399  166 
Average lifetime benefits 
 
7  52  94  112  131  149  177  196  212  225  135 
Average lifetime benefits/taxes  0.7  1.5  1.6  1.2  1.1  0.9  0.9  0.8  0.7  0.6  .81 
Measure of redistribution % by which 
benefits are increased  
-34%  77  84  46  22  10  0.8  -9  -20  -32  - 
Share of total benefits redistributed to 
the decile 
 
-0.30%  2.06  3.42  3.01  1.96  1.13  0.11  -1.51  -3.50  -6.38  11.68 




1.5  5.3  5.0  4.4  4.2  3.6  3.3  2.7  2.2  1.5  4.5 
75% 
 
  5.0  4.6  3.8  3.5  3.0  2.6  2.3  1.6  0.8  3.2 
50% 
 
  4.4  4.2  3.1  2.8  2.4  2.0  1.5  0.8  0.1  1.8 
25% 
 
  2.8  3.1  2.2  1.9  1.5  1.3  0.7  0.1  -0.6  0.1 
10% 
 
    2.2  1.3  1.2  0.8  0.4  .04  -0.5  -0.9  - 
* The base year for the rate of return calculation for the Early Boomer cohort is 2004.25 
  The bottom panel of Table 5 reports real rates of return by AIME decile computed conditional on 
survival. Looking at the last column, row 3 of the bottom panel, the median value for the real rate of 
return is 1.8 percentage points. It would appear both from the declining amount of redistribution as 
AIME increases across rows 3 and 4 of the top panel of Table 3A, and from the rapid decline in rate of 
return with AIME, that there is considerable redistribution fostered by the progressive benefit formula 
when evaluated considering own benefits and taxes at the level of the individual. 
  Table 6 reports comparable results based on the distribution of own taxes and benefits for 
members of the original HRS cohort, those ages 51 to 56 in 1992. Beginning with rows 1 through 3, the 
simple comparison of benefits and taxes for members of each AIME decile suggests considerable 
redistribution. Benefits substantially exceed taxes for those falling in the third to sixth AIME deciles. A 
comparison with results in Table 5 suggests that redistribution extends to members with higher relative 
incomes in 1992 than in 2004. For the 2004 cohort, those in the second, third and fourth deciles had own 
benefits exceed own taxes by 53 percent, 59 percent and 23 percent respectively. For the 1992 cohort, 
benefits exceeded taxes by 71 percent (48/28), 65 percent (79/48), 32 percent (98/74) and 15 percent 
(117/102) for members of the third, fourth, fifth and sixth AIME deciles respectively. While these raw 
numbers suggest there may have been more redistribution in 1992 than in 2004, the benefit reduction for 
members of the top three AIME categories suggests otherwise. Looking at the last column of row 5 in 
Tables 5 and 6, in 2004, 11.68 percent of total benefits paid to the cohort was redistributed from 
members of the three highest earning deciles. This is a greater amount of redistribution than in 1992, 
when 9.53 percent of total benefits paid was redistributed from members of the top AIME deciles.  26 
Table 6: Baseline Measures of Distribution and Redistribution of Own Social Security Benefits and Taxes for All Age Eligible Respondents in 
the HRS, 1992 
   
Annualized individual AIME deciles: 1992 (2004 dollars) 
0-1 K  1-4  4-8  8-13  13-19  19-27  27-35  35-44  44-52  52+  All 
 
Average lifetime taxes 
 
2  13  28  48  74  102  138  175  217  257  104 
Average lifetime benefits 
 
0  11  48  79  98  117  139  151  176  196  102 
Average lifetime benefits/taxes  0  0.8  1.7  1.6  1.3  1.1  1.0  0.8  0.8  0.8  0.98 
Measure of redistribution % by which benefits 
are increased  
-98  -19  68  64  34  15  0.4  -11  -16  -20  - 
Share of total benefits redistributed to the 
decile 
 
-0.30  -0.26  1.92  3.24  2.65  1.65  0.07  -2.00  -3.02  -3.95  9.53 




-  6.4  6.8  6.2  5.3  4.8  4.4  3.9  3.4  2.6  5.5 
75% 
 
-  4.8  6.2  5.7  4.8  4.4  3.9  3.4  2.8  2.0  4.2 
50% 
 
  -  5.3  4.9  3.9  3.6  3.1  2.7  2.1  1.1  2.6 
25% 
 
    2.5  3.4  2.7  2.3  2.1  1.8  1.3  0.30  0.5 
10% 
 
      2.0  1.6  1.4  1.1  0.9  0.6  0.5  - 





  Comparing rates of return between the two cohorts, the real median rate of return fell from 2.6 
percent in 1992 to 1.8 percent in 2004. Again, roughly speaking, the rate of return to those in the top 
three deciles in 2004 is lower than in 1992. Although this might be taken to suggest there is more 
redistribution in 2004 than in 1992, it should be remembered that the overall rate of return is lower in 
2004.   
  To be sure, the data in rows 3 and 4 of the top panel of Tables 5 and 6 do generate a bottom line 
regarding the various measures of distribution and redistribution at the level of the individual. The 
amount of redistribution of own benefits was somewhat, but not overwhelmingly higher for the 2004 
cohort than for the 1992 cohort. 
B. Differences in Redistribution Among Households by Cohort 
  Table 7 turns to data on benefits and taxes for households, counting within benefits paid not only 
benefits based on own work, but also including spouse and survivor benefits. Once households are 
considered, the picture changes. Recall our finding in Table 5 that in 2004, 11.7 percent of benefits was 
redistributed from individuals falling within the three top deciles of earners to those in lower deciles. In 
the top panel of Table 7, which pertains to households in 2004, we find that 7.08 percent (-.42 - 2.17 -
.48) of benefits are redistributed from members of the top three deciles of household units. Remember 
here that there are at least two major differences between redistribution among individuals and 
households. First, although individual and household earnings are imperfectly but positively related for 
men, the relationship is much weaker for women. Second, the data in Table 7 include the top-ups on 
own benefits for spouse and survivor benefits.  
  When these factors are taken into account, although there is redistribution, it is considerably less 
at the level of the household than at the level of the individual. This bottom line from our earlier work 28 
and those of other authors remains. Although the benefit formula is designed to be redistributive, and is 
redistributive at the level of the individual, lower earnings of women and the presence of spouse and 
survivor benefits at the household level continue to reduce the degree of redistribution fostered by the 
Social Security benefit formula. 
  On the other hand, there are important changes indicating that the redistribution fostered by the 
Social Security benefit formula has increased over time. The differences between the top and bottom 
panels of Table 7 show the extent of redistribution at the household level for the cohort of 2004.
18 The 
amount of redistribution at the household level is higher in 2004 than in 1992. Moreover, the increase in 
redistribution through 2004 is greater at the household level than at the level of the individual. 
                                                 
18 In our earlier study we found five percent of the total benefits accruing to households are 
redistributed from households falling in the top three deciles of earners. The results from our 
earlier study, which pertained to the full, original HRS cohort in 1992, are not comparable to the 
findings for the Early Boomer cohort. There are a number of sources of difference. For one thing, 
the 1992 cohort examined in our earlier paper is older (51 to 61 years old) in the base year than 
are the samples of 51 to 56 year olds. This means that for the original HRS cohort, benefits were 
discounted over fewer years than they are for the cohorts examined in this paper. That is, it takes 
fewer years between the date of the survey and the date Social Security benefits are first 
collected for a cohort that is 51 to 61 years old than for a cohort that is 51 to 56 years old. Age 
differences aside, other factors create differences between the Early Boomer and Original HRS 
cohorts. As mentioned previously, the age of receipt of full benefits was lower for the HRS 
cohort, who did not face the complete increase of the full retirement age to 66. In addition, 
interest rates were much higher during their period of high earnings for the HRS cohort. As a 
result, the value of their tax contributions is increased. One might consider a simulation exercise 
where those aged 51 to 56 in 1992 are given a birth date that occurs twelve years later. However, 
the members of the Original HRS cohort would have lower earnings than the Early Boomers. 
Adjusting for growth in earnings would require also adjusting for changes in the occupational 
and educational distribution of earnings, a task well outside the scope of this paper. 29 
Table 7: Measures of Distribution of Household Social Security Benefits and Taxes for All Age Eligible Respondents, Early Boomer 
and Original HRS Cohorts  
   
Annualized Household AIME deciles: 2004 (2004 dollars) 
0-12 K  12-23  23-33  33-41  41-52  52-63  63-75  75-88  88-103  103+  All 
Average family lifetime taxes 
 
$32K  87  138  180  218  279  316  365  435  547  260 
Average family lifetime benefits* 
 
55  136  186  214  258  308  337  374  401  440  271 
Average family lifetime benefits/taxes  1.7  1.6  1.3  1.2  1.2  1.1  1.1  1.0  0.9  0.8  1.04 
Measure of redistribution % by which 
benefits are increased  
60%  49  28  15  10  4  -0.01  -3  -14  -23  - 
Share of total benefits redistributed to 
decile 
 
1.00%  1.93  1.76  1.08  0.89  0.44  -0.00  -0.42  -2.17  -4.48  7.08 
   
Annualized Household AIME deciles: 1992 (2004 dollars) 
0-5K  5-13  13-21  21-29  29-37  37-44  44-51  51-59  59-69  69+  All 
 
Average family lifetime taxes 
 
$10 K  39  76  113  149  185  220  249  287  365  170 
Average family lifetime benefits 
 
8  70  115  158  204  239  273  300  342  379  209 
Average family lifetime benefits/taxes  0.8  1.8  1.5  1.4  1.4  1.3  1.2  1.2  1.2  1.0  1.23 
Measure of redistribution % by which 
benefits are increased  
-33%  45  23  12  9  3  1.1  -2.1  -3.8  -16.1  - 
Share of total benefits redistributed to 
decile 
 
-0.22%  1.13  1.14  0.84  0.86  0.37  0.14  -0.30  -0.63  -3.36  4.51 




  These findings are summarized in Figure 1. While the share of total benefits redistributed at the 
individual level increased from 9.51 percent in 1992 to 11.68 percent in 2004, the share of total benefits 
redistributed among households increased from 4.51 percent in 1992 to 7.08 percent in 2004. Thus the 
gap between the shares of benefits redistributed among individuals vs. at the household level remains 
roughly the same for these two cohorts. That is, redistribution based on own benefits for the 1992 cohort 
(9.53) minus redistribution based on family benefits (4.51) shows a difference in the level of 
redistribution between the individual and household levels of 5.02 percentage points. The comparable 
figure for the 2004 cohort is 4.60 percentage points (11.68 - 7.08). Redistribution at the household level 
remains smaller than the measured redistribution among individuals. 
  Figure 2 compares the rates of return by AIME decile at the family level. The data underlying 
Figure 2 are reported in Tables 8A and 8B. Looking at the third row, the rate of return for members of 
the second AIME decile (column 2) had a median value of 3.3 percentage points in 2004 and 5.1 
percentage points in 1992. By the highest decile of earners, the median value has fallen to 0.5 percentage 
points in 2004 from 1.5 percentage points in 1992.  
  Contrary to the direct measures of benefit redistribution reported above, as seen in Figure 2, 
although the rates of return are lower in 2004 than in 1992, they decline at roughly the same rate for 
each cohort when proceeding from low to high AIME deciles. Thus a comparison of the distributions of 
rates of returns by AIME decile does not suggest a strong difference in benefit redistribution for 
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Table 8A: Rates of Return on Social Security Benefits and Taxes by AIME Decile, Early Boomer Cohort, Ages 51 to 56 in 2004  
   
Annualized Household AIME deciles: 2004 (2004 dollars) 
0-12 K  12-23  23-33  33-41  41-52  52-63  63-75  75-88  88-103  103+  All 
Rate of return percentiles 2004   
90% 
 
5.1  4.4  4.1  3.6  3.3  3.0  2.6  2.2  2.1  1.8  3.8 
75% 
 
4.7  3.9  3.3  2.9  2.6  2.5  2.0  1.8  1.6  1.2  2.7 
50% 
 
3.8  3.3  2.6  2.2  1.9  1.7  1.2  1.0  0.7  0.5  1.6 
25% 
 
-  2.0  1.7  0.7  0.7  0.7  0.6  0.4  0.4  0.3  0.2 
10% 
 
-  -  -  1.2  0.6  0.4  0.2  -  -  -  - 
*weighted 
Table 8B: Rates of Return on Social Security Benefits and Taxes by AIME Decile, Households with One Member 51 to 56 in 1992  
   
Annualized Household AIME deciles: 1992 (2004 dollars) 
0-5K  5-13  13-21  21-29  29-37  37-44  44-51  51-59  59-69  69+  All 
 




6.0  6.5  5.5  5.2  5.0  4.5  4.4  3.9  3.8  3.2  5.2 
75% 
 
-  5.9  4.9  4.6  4.3  3.9  3.6  3.2  3.1  2.4  4.1 
50% 
 
-  5.1  3.9  3.6  3.3  3.1  2.6  2.3  2.0  1.5  2.7 
25% 
 
  3.2  2.7  2.3  2.0  2.0  1.6  1.2  0.8  0.5  1.2 
10% 
 
  -  1.5  1.1  1.0  1.0  0.8  0.3  0.2  0.2  - 
*weighted.     
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V. Robustness of Findings 
  This section examines the sensitivity of differences in measured outcomes between the 
2004 and 1992 cohorts to two differences between the relevant time periods in which they 
worked and claim benefits.  First, there has been an increase in the share of households 
consisting of one divorced person that may affect measures of distribution and redistribution 
(Tamborini, Iams and Whitman, 2009). Second, there are differences in the interest rates applied 
to the two cohorts.  
Sensitivity to Changes in Family Structure   
  Table 9 presents revised measures of redistribution when household weights are adjusted 
to hold constant the share of one person, divorced households. Specifically, the share of such 
households in 2004 is adjusted to the level in 1992. 
  As seen in Table 7, when the household distribution is not adjusted for changes in the 
share of single, divorced households, 7.08 percent of total benefits are redistributed. When the 
mix of households is standardized to control for the growth of households with a single, divorced 
person, the bottom row, bottom column of Table 9 suggests that 7.25 percent of total benefits are 
redistributed. Thus the basic findings are not very sensitive to the increase in the number of 
divorced households. 34 
Table 9: Measures of Distributions of Household Social Security Benefits and Taxes for All Age Eligible Respondents (Weights are 
adjusted for divorced families). 
  
   
Annualized Household AIME Deciles: 2004 (2004 dollars) 
0-12 K  12-24  24-34  34-43  43-53  53-63  65-76  76-89  89-105  105+  All 
Average family lifetime taxes 
 
$34 K  91  146  187  234  286  330  382  445  565  270 
Average family lifetime benefits* 
 
$58 K  142  195  224  270  325  340  385  412  447  280 
Measure of redistribution % by which 
benefits are increased  
60%  49  25  15  8  7  -2  -4  -13  -24  - 
Share of total benefits redistributed to 
decile 
 
1.05%  2.02  1.63  1.13  0.73  0.69  -0.28  -0.62  -1.88  -4.47  7.25 






Sensitivity to Changes in the Interest Rate 
  When computing outcomes for the 2004 and 1992 cohorts, different interest rates were 
used. The rates used for the 2004 cohort are those in place twelve years later than the interest 
rates used for the 1992 cohort. Interest rates are generally higher for the 1992 cohort. A higher 
interest rate reduces the present value of benefits and increases the present value of taxes paid 
when yearly values are moved to the base period. Thus if the 1992 cohort enjoyed the lower 
interest rates experienced by members of the 2004 cohort, the present value of their benefits as of 
1992 would have been higher, and the present value of their taxes lower. 
  To estimate the effects of these differences in interest rates, Table 10 reports the present 
values calculated for the 2004 cohort (column 1) and the 1992 cohort (column 3) using the 
interest rates that actually applied to those cohorts. Column 2 calculates comparable values for 
the 1992 cohort using the interest rates that applied to the 2004 cohort. All values are taken to the 
base year, either 1992 or 2004 as appropriate, and are converted to 2004 dollars. 
  The rows of Table 10 then report the present value of taxes, the present value of benefits, 
and the share of total benefits redistributed among deciles. The first panel is for individuals based 
on own earnings. The second is for households from each cohort. Household benefits are the sum 
of own benefits of each spouse in married households and any spouse and survivor benefits that 
would accrue to the low earning spouse.  
  The last column of Table 10 indicates the share of the difference in the relevant value 
between the 1992 and 2004 cohort that is due to the interest rate. For example, take the present 
value of benefits to be received by households. The measured difference in benefits is $271,000 
in 2004 (from column 1) minus $209,000 in 1992 (from column 3). The part of the difference 36 
from $209,000 to $226,000 (the value in column 2 minus the value in column 3) is due to the 
lower interest rate facing the 2004 cohort. So as reported in column 4, 27 percent of the 
difference in benefits is due to the difference in interest rates [(226-209)/(271 - 209)].  
  In the case of taxes, the higher interest rate applicable when summing up the 1992 
cohort's lifetime taxes increased the base value of the tax, and caused the difference in the taxes 
paid by the 2004 and 1992 cohorts to be understated by just over a quarter.  
  These findings mean that the raw differences in present value overstate the fall in the 
benefit/tax ratio for Social Security between 1992 and 2004. Nevertheless, there has been a 
substantial decline in the value of benefits relative to taxes over the period, as indicated by the 
fall in the rates of return, which are not subject to the effects of changing market interest rates. 
Remember that whatever the implications for differences between the cohorts in benefits and 
taxes, the level of benefits and taxes paid by the 2004 cohort still differ in present value by only 
4 percent, as shown in Table 4. 
  More importantly, from the perspective of this paper, the differences in redistribution 
measured in this paper are hardly affected by the difference in the interest rate. As seen in the 
last column, last row of Table 10, the measured difference in redistribution affecting each cohort 
is changed by only 14 percent when the interest rates are standardized.  
  These exercises suggest our findings are not sensitive either to the differences in the 
structure of families between the cohorts, or to differences in the interest rates that prevailed 
between the two cohorts. 
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Table 10: Sensitivity of Measures of Benefits, Distribution and Redistribution to the Interest Rate Employed 
(Interest rates applicable to persons of the same age from the 2004 cohort are applied to benefits and taxes for members 
of the 1992 Cohort) 
 
  2004 Cohort Using 
2004 Interest Rates 
1992 Cohort Using 
2004 Interest Rates 
1992 Cohort Using 
1992 Interest Rates 
Share of 2004-
1992 Cohort 
Difference Due to 
Interest Rate 
Values for Individuals Based on Own Earnings  
     Present Value of Benefits   135  110  102  .24 
     Present Value of Taxes   166  90  104  -.23 
     Share of Total Benefits Redistributed   11.68  9.19  9.53  .16 
Values for Households 
     Present Value of Benefits   271  226  209  .27 
     Present Value of Taxes   260  145  170  -.28 
     Share of Total Benefits Redistributed   7.08  4.86  4.51  .14 
All values of benefits and taxes are in thousands of 2004 dollars. 38 
VI. Conclusions   
This paper has measured the difference in redistribution of benefits fostered by the Social 
Security system between cohorts of individuals and households from the Health and Retirement 
Study. In summarizing our findings, a number of results may be highlighted. Comparing the 
1992 and 2004 cohorts, benefits received by members of the highest AIME deciles are reduced 
by a greater proportional amount in 2004 than they were in 1992. The fraction of total Social 
Security benefits redistributed from high to low earning individuals increased from 9.5 percent 
for the 1992 cohort to 11.7 percent for the 2004 cohort. At the household level, the fraction of 
benefits redistributed from high to low earning households increased from 4.5 percent to 7.1 
percent. Nevertheless, a 4.6 percentage point gap remains between the share of benefits 
redistributed at the individual and household levels. In sum, the 2004 Social Security system, by 
some measures, was somewhat more effective in redistributing benefits to low AIME 
households, but was still substantially less effective in redistributing benefits among households 
arrayed according to lifetime covered earnings than it was in redistributing benefits among 
individuals according to own earnings. 
Looking to the future, it will not be long until data for the 2010 HRS households become 
available. One can expect an update of this study to indicate progress in the same direction as 
measured here. Women from the new, younger HRS cohort will have shown even greater 
attachment to the labor market. Nevertheless, the Social Security system is likely to remain less 
effective in redistributing benefits among families with different income than is suggested by the 
basic benefit formula. 39 
From a policy perspective, this study provides basic facts upon which to base any policy 
changes meant to revise the redistributive effects of the OASI system. The degree of 
redistribution remains quite modest at the household level. Perhaps the lack of effective 
redistribution has increased the popularity of the program as a source of income in retirement. 
That is an issue for policy makers to wrestle with. They must decide whether they are happy with 
the rather modest level of redistribution of Social Security benefits at the household level, or 
whether they would prefer a system that is more, or less, redistributive.  
   40 
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